Product segment / AI / AGENTS

AI application & agent security

Explore controls for model inputs, sensitive data, delegated identity, and the tools an autonomous system can use.

8 product profilesResearch reviewed

The job to be done

Give an AI application a bounded task and verify that its model, credentials, tools and runtime controls preserve those boundaries.

AI application and agent security protects the system using a model: its data, instructions, retrieved documents, credentials and actions. Start with the trust boundary. A document may be legitimate evidence while containing instructions that the agent must never obey. Runtime filters inspect content; authorization decides which actions are permitted; evaluation tests the assembled system; inventory and model scanning examine what is deployed. These are complementary control purposes, so this first edition is a research map rather than a vendor ranking. For an educational Agentic SOC deployment, a useful success criterion is an investigation that produces evidence without gaining permission to isolate a host merely because an alert asked it to.

What goes in

  • Model requests and retrieved content
  • Agent identities, tool schemas and delegated permissions
  • Evaluation cases and action audit records

What should come out

  • Policy decisions and blocked unsafe actions
  • Traceable tool use and bounded credentials
  • Evaluation results and documented failure modes

Inside the segment

These capabilities answer different questions. Use the distinction to define the work before assembling a shortlist.

Runtime input and output controls

Inspect prompts, retrieved content and responses for policy violations at defined integration points.

Boundary: A detection result cannot revoke a credential. Application code or the integrated service must enforce the result, including timeouts and streaming behavior.

Agent authorization and tool controls

Authorize each tool call using the caller, action, resource and constrained arguments outside model instructions.

Boundary: Gateway policy only protects traffic that traverses that gateway. Direct API routes, broad credentials and delegated user context need separate controls.

Security evaluation

Exercise a fixed application and agent configuration with adversarial and benign cases before and after changes.

Boundary: A passing evaluation samples behavior; it does not prove that every future prompt, language, tool sequence or model version is safe.

AI inventory and supply-chain assessment

Identify AI assets and inspect model artifacts, dependencies and configuration before deployment.

Boundary: Artifact scanning cannot establish that a deployed agent has appropriate business authority or that every generated answer is correct.

How the work flows

  1. Draw the action boundary

    List model providers, retrieved data, tools and credentials. Mark which inputs are untrusted and which actions need a separate human approval. Give the investigation worker a distinct, minimally privileged identity.

  2. Build a synthetic evaluation set

    Pair harmless business questions with test documents containing conflicting instructions and synthetic secrets. Define success by observable data access and tool outcomes, not by the fluency of the answer.

  3. Wire the control into the path

    Apply content inspection at the actual model and retrieval boundaries. Enforce tool authorization independently. Record behavior when a filter times out, a policy rejects a call or a response streams before inspection completes.

  4. Verify evidence and useful work

    Capture policy decisions and permitted or denied actions without retaining unnecessary prompt content. Verify that a denied write made no downstream change and that legitimate read-only work still completes.

  5. Retest each meaningful change

    Version the model, system instructions, tools, permissions and test set together. Re-run representative cases after any change and investigate both missed attacks and newly blocked legitimate requests.

The environment changes the question

Use these scenarios to adapt the evaluation to your organization. They describe operational concerns, not a determination of compliance.

Finance ↗

A support agent may explain a synthetic transaction but must not issue a refund solely because a retrieved email requests it.

Evaluate: Bind authorization to the customer, amount and approved action; test the tool outcome independently of prompt filtering.

Utilities ↗

A maintenance assistant summarizes fictional plant manuals containing an embedded instruction to change a control setting.

Evaluate: Keep plant controls outside the assistant identity and preserve the distinction between a recommendation and an executable command.

Manufacturing ↗

A procurement agent reads a supplier document that attempts to redirect a purchase order to a different account.

Evaluate: Validate supplier identity and business approval at the transaction boundary, while retaining evidence of the rejected instruction.

Healthcare ↗

An administrative assistant uses synthetic patient records to answer scheduling questions while a document asks for unrelated records.

Evaluate: Test record-level authorization and minimize prompt logging; content classification is not permission to disclose another patient record.

What drives the operating cost

  • Request volume, text or token size, model calls made by evaluators and retained telemetry can have separate billing meters.
  • Inline checks add latency and availability dependencies; benchmark retries, streaming and outage behavior for the actual application.
  • Self-hosted libraries shift configuration, model hosting, upgrades and operating responsibility to your team.
  • Continuous evaluation requires maintained test cases, adjudication of ambiguous results and time from application owners.

Questions worth asking

  1. Where is policy enforced when model output requests a real action?
  2. Can a compromised document cause access beyond the assigned task?
  3. Which protections are deterministic and which depend on model judgments?

Common assumptions to check

An AI security product is any security tool that uses AI.

This segment covers protecting AI systems themselves. An AI-powered phishing detector or SOC assistant is a different product purpose.

A strong system prompt is an authorization boundary.

Model instructions influence behavior. Credentials, resource permissions and deterministic tool policy determine what the application can actually do.

A model scanner, runtime filter and red-team platform can share one fair ranking.

They answer different questions and require different tests. This research map groups by control purpose before introducing any comparable scoring cohort.

APPLY THE IDEA / EVALUATION PLAN

Make the outcome observable.

Give a lab investigation agent synthetic evidence containing conflicting instructions. Check that it cannot expand its tool permissions, expose a planted secret or act beyond its assigned case.

  1. Freeze an application, model and tool-policy version.

    A reviewer can reproduce the configuration, dataset and intended allow/deny outcomes without production credentials.

  2. Run paired benign and adversarial cases.

    The report includes legitimate-task completion, missed attacks, false positives and actual downstream actions, not only a vendor risk score.

  3. Exercise bypass and failure paths.

    Direct tool access, filter timeouts, oversized inputs and interrupted streaming have explicit results and leave no unintended state change.

  4. Retest an Agentic SOC investigation with a malicious instruction inside evidence.

    The agent cites the suspicious content as data, keeps its authorized read scope, and cannot invoke containment without the separate approval path.

Use synthetic data and an authorized test environment. Record scope, product edition, permissions, results, and recovery behavior.

Vendors & products

8 profiles

An editorial selection of relevant offerings, with documented scope and practical evaluation questions. Atlas Fold provides a separate provisional documentation assessment for selected offerings; inclusion in this directory is not a ranking.

Cisco / Security evaluation

Cisco AI Defense

This profile emphasizes AI Model and Application Validation, with AI Runtime as an adjacent module. Confirm integration, supported models and entitlement; the management API labels MCP connection scanning beta, which is not established production coverage.

Palo Alto Networks / AI inventory and supply-chain assessment

Palo Alto Networks Prisma AIRS

The research-map entry focuses on AI Model Security within Prisma AIRS. AI Runtime Firewall, AI Runtime API, red teaming and agent protection are separate documented areas; verify their licenses and deployment paths rather than assuming platform branding enables them.

Check Point / Runtime input and output controls

Check Point AI Guardrails

Scope this entry to the AI Guardrails input/output service. Broader Check Point AI Agent Runtime Security and workforce controls require their own integration review. The privacy sheet distinguishes hosted processing from a self-hosted deployment.

Microsoft / Runtime input and output controls

Microsoft Azure AI Content Safety

Scope this profile to Content Safety and Prompt Shields. Foundry integrations can enforce policies differently from a direct API integration. Groundedness, task-adherence and other preview functions should be checked for their current release status and region.

Amazon Web Services / Agent authorization and tool controls

Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Policy

This entry covers Policy with AgentCore Gateway, not the entire Bedrock portfolio. Calls that bypass the gateway need their own controls. Bedrock Guardrails is a separate content-inspection service, and neither product automatically grants appropriate downstream credentials.

Google Cloud / Runtime input and output controls

Google Cloud Model Armor

Scope this entry to Model Armor and its supported integrations. The overview describes single-request inspection rather than conversational memory, and identifies image screening as preview. Documents and images are not supported by every integration.

NVIDIA / Runtime input and output controls

NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails

This profile covers the NeMo Guardrails library, not an automatically managed enterprise security service. Supported models, rail engines and deployment options differ; an enabled input rail does not imply that retrieval or tool execution is also protected.

HiddenLayer / Security evaluation

HiddenLayer AI Attack Simulation

Scope this profile to Attack Simulation and the documented red-teaming workflow. HiddenLayer discovery, supply-chain assessment and runtime protection are separate platform areas. Public product pages establish the intended workflow but do not independently verify detection rates or integration effort.

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